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Abstract Trust has become an important aspect of
evaluating the relationship between lay public and
technology implementation. Experiences have shown
that a focus on trust provides a richer understanding
of reasons for backlashes of technology in society
than a mere focus of public understanding of risks and
science communication. Therefore, trust is also
widely used as a key concept for understanding and
predicting trust or distrust in emerging technologies.
But whereas trust broadens the scope for understand-
ing established technologies with well-defined ques-
tions and controversies, it easily fails to do so with
emerging technologies, where there are no shared
questions, a lack of public familiarity with the
technology in question, and a restricted understanding
amongst social researchers as to where distrust is
likely to arise and how and under which form the
technology will actually be implemented. Rather
contrary, ‘trust’ might sometimes even direct social
research into fixed structures that makes it even more
difficult for social research to provide socially robust
knowledge. This article therefore suggests that if trust
is to maintain its important role in evaluating
emerging technologies, the approach has to be
widened and initially focus not on people’s motiva-
tions for trust, but rather the object of trust it self, as
to predicting how and where distrust might appear,
how the object is established as an object of trust, and
how it is established in relation with the public.
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Introduction: The Role of Trust in Upstream
Engagement
‘Now thinking about nanotechnology: Nano-
technology involves working with atoms and
molecules to make new particles that are used in
cosmetics to make better anti-aging creams,
suntan oils for better protection against skin
cancer and cleaning fluids to make the home
more hygienic. Despite these benefits, some
scientists are concerned about the unknown and
possibly negative effects of nanoparticles in the
body and in the environment.’
-Introduction to Respondents
in Eurobarometer’s Survey [10].
Over the past decades, trust has become one of the
core concepts in the literature on risk governance and
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understanding of public opinions regarding particular
technologies are considered to be important in order to
avoid public protests that could arise because of these
technologies–similar to biotechnology in Europe or
nuclear and chemical technologies in the United States
[13, 19, 40]. Since certain sociologists, like for example
Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens [3, 12], began
focusing on the concept of trust as relevant for our
understanding of changes in society due to technological
advances, understanding and fostering of trust have been
seen as key factors in grasping the changing relationship
between society in general and technology. Trust is then
considered not only as an analytical tool, but also as a
prerequisite for cooperation in all its variations, and as a
social lubricant necessary for stability, prediction and
normative integration (Misztal [31]:10, Poortinga and
Pidgeon [37]). Therefore, analyzing public understand-
ing of technology in the light of trust should also
strengthen the development of a sound scientific
practice, one that is in accordance with public opinion.
Among the several explorations into the backlashes
in relation to technology, two key reasons for the lack
of confidence have been suggested: 1) That public
confidence in scientific advice to government has
been undermined by a series of badly-handled
technological controversies, for example surrounding
nuclear power, genetically modified foods and the
BSE scandal, and 2) that there is an ambiguity and
unease about scientific advances running ahead of
both public awareness and control [2].
Thus a need arises—both from the perspective of
science and the public—to establish new models of
thinking about the relationship between science and
society that can serve all stakeholders. Because
technology development often happens outside
established democratic channels, with unknown
risks and ambiguity regarding the stakeholders
involved, a lack of public codetermination arises.
Social research can compensate for this deficiency
by mediating between the scientific community and
the public when technology is implemented in
society. Nowotny, Scott and Gibbons coined their
influential notion of socially robust, or context-
sensitive, knowledge [11, 34–36] to address this
need for new models of thinking. They claim that
reliable knowledge can only be achieved by includ-
ing social knowledge and through an increased
sensibility to the concrete and local environments
in which the technology is implemented. Therefore,
they see the involvement of social scientists in
science policy as increasingly important in the
successful implementation of technological innova-
tions in society.
The notion of social robustness is important
because it corresponds to the double analytical
function of the concept ‘trust’. Early studies on trust
in relation to public understanding of technology
maintain very much the same focus as Nowotny, Scott
and Gibbons, namely to challenge the so called deficit
model [46]. The model is built on the widely held
assumption that public distrust in technology is due to
a lack of or misinterpreted information. Although it
seems likely that some distrust is due to such a deficit,
the first deficit model challengers argued that many
other social factors are also at stake when the
scientific community is involved with the lay public.
Science is not communicated to the public according
to a one-to-one model. Values are at stake, as is trust
in expertise, decision making and local knowledge. In
his study on the sheep farmers in Cumbria facing
restrictions due to radioactivity allegedly stemming
from Chernobyl [47], Brian Wynne shows how
scientists fail to gain the farmers’ trust due to a lack
of such contextual knowledge. Not only the scientists
ignored local knowledge that would have made them
aware that the radioactivity actually came from the
nuclear reprocessing complex Sellafield. They also
recommended the farmers to let their lambs graze in
the valley, assuming that its improved grass would
flush the radioactivity more quickly, ignoring the
farmers knowledge that intensive grazing on this
sparse resource could have long term damaging
consequences.
Trust is seen not only as the consequence of a
successful communication of science in public, that
is, the goal of this focus is not just to convince the
public of the safety of new technologies. Rather,
an important precondition for such approaches is
‘to engender and ensure public confidence and
trust based on the inclusion of public concern in
decision making’ (Kearnes and Wynne [25]:
137).
Therefore Kearnes and Wynne’s( [ 25]:134) com-
mentary on the general shift in focus—from placing
the problem in the public’s lack of understanding to
the public’s lack of trust—is not an inaccurate
description of the general social scientific approach
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science and technology.
Trust is seen as as ‘lubricating’, that is, important
to reestablishing the confident relationship between
technological innovations and the public. But trust is
also seen as an analytical tool for understanding social
mechanisms around the implementation of new
technology [37]. ‘Trust’ is better than ‘understanding’
because the former includes various factors that are
relevant for good decisions. Not only it includes the
kind of distinctive rationality that Wynne observed in
Cumbria and that would not be targeted thorugh the
lenses of scientific knowledge alone. Other kinds of
motivations for trust might be relevant in the context of
a conflict or the implementation of a given technology.
Such an analysis should help those involved in
technology development to ensure the implementation
of socially robust and trustworthy science.
Based on these experiences, trust has become one
of several important approaches in upstream engage-
ment, by which lay people are included in advisory
discussions on emerging technologies from an early
stage, related to emerging technologies. Today it is
commonly agreed by authorities, as well as stake-
holders, that such engagement is important [30]. Early
engagement provides the opportunity for lay people to
add new perspectives and knowledge, such as local
knowledge. This may lead not only to better decisions
being made by experts and decision makers [45], but
also, procedurally, the consultation of the public
makes technology more socially legitimate. Hereby
one assumes that the many controversies that follow
with the broadening of new technology can be
avoided.
In this article I aim to study how the concept of
trust is being used in upstream engagement related to
the emerging field of nanotechnologies. The question
is whether the use of the concept of trust provides the
dimensions of “social robustness” it is supposed to.
My claim is that this is not the case. Unlike studies
where controversies are established and motivations
for trust might provide a richer understanding for
understanding and predicting distrust, studies on lay
attitudes regarding nanotechnology adopt the struc-
tures of previous experiences in a way that directs and
fixes the analyses. Thus they sometimes fail to
establish a relevant understanding of the problem in
question, and social research risk to become irrelevant
or simply failing to provide the interaction between
lay public and the science community in developing
sound scientific practices. The central argument of
this article is that if trust is to remain an important
tool in social research upon emerging technologies, it
has to problematize the structures according to which
it operates. This can be done through a study of
theories on trust, but also by a different approach
regarding nanotechnology; namely to focus on the
concept ‘nanotechnology’ it self and how it will or
will not be established as a possible object of trust.
Nanotechnology and Public Engagement
The emergence of nanotechnology already caught the
attention of social research at its very beginning.
Learning from the public’s negative reception of
genetically modified products (GM), especially in
Europe, there has been a broad interest in developing
nanotechnology in close dialogue with lay people and
scholars. Numerous authoritative reports, such as the
independent British report from the Royal Society and
Royal Academy of Engineering from 2004 [38], draw
attention to the importance of the social dimensions of
nanotechnology and have thus contributed to setting
the standard. This report focused particularly on the
public’s understanding of nanotechnology in a way
that adds to the purely perceptive level, that is, how
people think and feel about nanotechnology. Integrat-
ing public understanding is supposed to make a
difference with regard to how nanotechnologies are
developed and regulated; a point that has broad
consensus amongst leading scholars doing research
in the area.
1 This is fully in accordance with the idea
of socially robust knowledge. It is therefore particu-
larly important that the information retrieved from
studies on lay attitudes is of such a character that it
might actually provide the grounds for making such a
difference. Is this the case with nanotechnology?
In this article I have chosen to focus primarily on
surveys. Firstly because they are widely used in
trying to determine the emerging relationship people
have with nanotechnology. Secondly I find it
reasonable to believe that surveys, with their easy
access to simplified opinions from a large group of
people, have greater political influence than other
approaches.
1 Barnett et al. See also [45].
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nanotechnology have appeared in recent years.
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Broadly speaking, the main conclusion is that the
"new GM" has not materialized. People in general
support nanotechnology, especially for medical
research and renewable energy, whereas they tend to
be more skeptical about who controls the technology
and want more research that can ensure that applica-
tions are safe. Americans are generally more positive
to nanotechnology than Europeans. At the same time,
people still—roughly 10 years after the first surveys
were conducted—know little about nanotechnology.
More than half of the respondents in the recently
published Eurobarometer had not even heard about it
(Gaskell et al. [10]:22).
Despite the efforts and the somewhat promising
results, one can question whether the findings actually
help to develop the kind of 'socially robust knowl-
edge' they are supposed to. Rather, my claim is that
the use of surveys in measuring public trust in
nanotechnology doo not provide the substantial
knowledge intended, and additionally helps to con-
fuse and blur both the role and the significance of
public engagement in nanotechnology.
My critique is centred around three points: First of
all, there is lack of familiarity with nanotechnology. it
is therefore difficult to know what expressed opinions
are actually expressions of. Secondly, there is a lack
of clarity with the concept nanotechnology it self. The
definition of nanotechnology is contested, and so is its
function. It is still unclear whether nanotechnology is
a new scientific paradigm or a research strategy.
Combined with different definitions of nanotechnol-
ogy, it is unclear to which extent—if at all—
'nanotechnology' will actually remain the concept
around which our understanding of the underlying
technologies will relate to. In combination with the
missing familiarity with nanotechnology, this causes
unclarity regarding expressed opinions as well as the
object the opinions are supposed to relate to. Thirdly,
this questions the role of social engagement, because
the two previous points make it unclear which
function and role the social engagement has. If they
are not able to provide analytical material that can
enlighten the efforts of establishing a socially robust
development of nanotechnology, their function might
be reduced into mere consumer analysis to the benefit
of commercial interests.
Facing Vagueness in Upstream Engagement: How
Social Research Fails to Legitimate its Role
Recent surveys show that compared to other kinds of
technology, many find it difficult to understand and to
relate to the many instruments, products and research
areas that are comprised under the label nanotechnol-
ogy. In this respect, the concept simply lacks clarity
[42]. Some have tried to compensate for this by
calling for more involvement by lay people in the
evaluation of concrete applications of nanotechnolo-
gy. Thus it should be easier—at least potentially—to
relate to the everyday life of the respondents and
avoid nanotechnology being just an abstract concept.
[10, 20]. This is in line with interpretations of the
experiences with GM, where one finding was that
‘moral concerns attach specifically to particular
applications and not necessarily to underlying molec-
ular biology techniques’ [16]. But this interpretation
and approach is contested.
3
For a long time, the problem has been people’s
general lack of familiarity with nanotechnology and
thus it is difficult to know what the survey questions
are actually measuring when ‘opinions’ are expressed.
In addition there has been a general tendency among
surveys to address people’s concerns within a quite
broad space of ‘advantages’ and ‘risks’. Such fram-
ings might fit well into risk assessment and regulatory
work, but it is far from sure that the same can be said
with regards to how people’s attitudes are reflected.
Surveys conducted on GM clearly showed that such
generalisations are insufficient when it comes to
catching people’s ‘real’ attitudes towards biotechno-
logical applications [15].
2 See for example [24], The Royal Academy and Royal
Academy of Engineering Report, more surveys from Woodrow
Wilson Center in Washington, Nature Nanotechnology and
Eurobarometer.
3 Although one could easily assume that people in some cases
find it easier to relate to particular applications of technology
that influence their daily lives, still some technologies, like
GM, are politically and socially shaped in a way that makes the
generic understanding of the entire technology influential for
the understanding of all the specific applications subordinated
to the generic label.
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adopt ‘attitudes’ to a given technology while they
simultaneously ignore the factors that lead to the
creation of these attitudes [24].
To compensate for these shortenings, several
surveys have tried to incorporate various aspects that
have proven to be important in shaping people’s
attitudes towards nanotechnology. For example,
more recent work has taken the so called ‘cultural
cognition hypothesis’, which tries to see the
connection between people’s convictions and their
attitudes towards technology, as a starting point.
Generally, perceptions of risks are often tightly
related to other factors, such as political values, a
relationship that would not appear unless specifi-
cally examined. Amongst the findings is the fact
that people with more ‘egalitarian’ views tend to be
more negative towards nanotechnology than people
with a more ‘individualistic’ political orientation.
This is also mirrored in the way they conceive risk:
A more egalitarian person tends to perceive risks as
more serious than an ‘individualist’,e v e nw h e n
provided with more information [22]. Further
analytical improvements, like the meta-analytical
approach to surveys, where results from independent
studies are aggregated into statistical overviews,
provide even more nuanced knowledge for better
understanding and mapping of public perceptions of
risk related to nanotechnology [21, 40].
The question is to what extent or in which sense
elaborating people’s motivations or grounds for trust
or distrust is relevant for determining the meaning of
nanotechnology in public.
Indeed, perspectives on motivations, power and
vulnerability structures related to trusting relations are
relevant for understanding mechanisms of trust and
distrust (see for example Grimen [14], Cook et al. [4],
Hardin [17]). And this is also the reason why Kearnes
and Wynne above are talking about a shift in focus
from 'understanding' to 'trust', because the latter, by
studying risk perception involving other factors than
pure scientific analysis, provides richer grounds for
understanding such mechanisms. With 'trust' we
incorporate important factors that would not have
been included with 'understanding'. But then it is
important to bear in mind that this shift has happened
in a context of already established conflicts, and is not
necessarily valid for upstream engagement operating
with several unknown factors.
On the contrary a study of motivations for 'trust' in
'nanotechnology' might blur the fact that many of the
methods used in social research with nanotechnology,
like focus groups, consensus conferences, surveys and
citizen juries, draw upon earlier experiences in areas
where there are well-defined questions concerning
products or practices that directly influence the people
involved.
Several commentators criticize surveys for distort-
ing double- or multifaceted meanings by forcing
people to answer within categories that are, in the
worst case, totally irrelevant to them. Even when
relevant, this type of study is often not suitable to
reflect nuances in meaning or ambivalence in people’s
attitudes [2].
Sarah Davies et al. [5] criticize the ways social
research creates certain structures that force people to
answer particular questions so that the way questions
are posed, directs research results. Even though
surveys bring an even richer understanding of certain
kind of motivations for trust or distrust in technology,
it is not evident what these motivations refer to. In
fact, this is even more complicated because what is
true for using the concept ‘nanotechnology’ is also
valid for ‘trust’. What does it mean to trust? What do
different actors intend to express if they say they trust
a technology? How strong these motivations are, if
they are of any consequence in people’s factual future
relationship with nanotechnology, or if people could
take precautions against nanotechnology even if they
wanted to. Some survey work also ‘runs the risk of
slipping back into understanding how public should
relate to nanotechnology in terms of a deficit model,
whether this is of knowledge or of trust’ (Davies et al.
[5] referring to Wynne).
Research into trust itself is trapped by its own
frames when confronted by an object that is
qualitatively different from earlier objects of study.
W h i l er e s e a r c hi n t ot r u s tr e l a t e dt ob i o t e c h n o l o g y
arose in the context of controversies within the
field, it is not clear at all with nanotechnology what
actually the problem is. Although nanotechnology
today could be said to be more than mere hype,
given that there are already more than 1000
products on the market and even more in the
pipeline, the modest familiarity with nanotechnolo-
gy among the public still makes it appear vague
and represents a challenge for the measuring of the
public’s understanding.
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One highly relevant question is whether it is likely
to believe that the concept ‘nanotechnology’ could
be the locus of such conflicts in the future at all.
If we are in a situation of unfamiliarity, we can
assume that increased familiarity and understand-
ing of motivations will increase our understanding
of people's attitudes, and hereby making us better
suited for predicting grounds for trust or distrust. But
this presupposes that the object in question is
actually the right target for our analysis. Several
factors indicate that this might not the case with
'nanotechnology':
In March 2006, the protective glass and bathroom
sealant MagicNano was recalled in Germany, after
causing severe breathing problems for some consum-
ers [33]. The product was first labeled as nanotech-
nology but was later recalled and redefined following
the negative attention that followed in the media.
Although the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment in
Berlin later concluded that the product contained no
nanoparticles, it has been suggested that the nano
label is so loosely defined that it is easy to avoid
conflicts simply by redefining it [6]. As one of
Matthew Kearnes et al.’s respondents expressed
([24]:39), ‘[I]f nanotechnology is going to be a bad
word then let’s call it something else’. This leads us
naturally into a discussion around how committing
the concept of nanotechnology is for those imple-
menting technological products involving molecular
technology, and which influence a low degree of
commitment would have upon mechanisms of trust
and distrust. The concept of nanotechnology is
contested, and it is still unclear whether the term
refers to a new scientific paradigm or simply a
research strategy [26]. If the latter is assumed, it is
not obvious that the term will stick to products if
nanotechnology is conceived as something negative
in public.
If this is the case, we risk—at least hypotheti-
cally—that efforts of determining and predicting
trust are framed in a way that are actually not
relevant for what is going on. If we determine
people's 'trust' in 'nanotechnology', whereas the
underlying technologies or applications are actually
being implemented with a different name, or with no
name at all—the entire effort might have been
completely out of target and fails to find the shared
question or problem to negotiate upon. Davies et al.
write:
‘At a more fundamental level, this and the
question of problem definition highlight the
essential performativity of public engagement on
emerging technologies. While all engagement
processes shape their participants into certain
forms of citizens mobilised around certain kinds
of issues […], those focussed around upstream
technologies are exemplary in doing this in that
they take what to many participants is an invisible
issue—an o n –issue—and create a problem, ex
nihilo. In doing so they not only construct a
problem to be solved, but a group of citizens who
are to perform their concerns in certain ways.
This feature of public engagement with nano-
technology—and the impact that this creative
process has on resulting public debate and wider
discourses—remains, if not exactly a challenge to
be overcome, a key aspect of the role of social
science to be reflected upon’.
This opens several questions regarding measuring
the amount of public trust in nanotechnology. First of
all, one can question whether the very use of the
concept of trust contributes to make the structures of
the approach to public understanding fixed and inert.
Many of the answers given in surveys are so open and
flexible that they do not provide a useful material for
helping to make good decisions based upon people’s
well-reflected opinions.
On this background I argue that there is a
connection between how 'trust' is framed and
understood—implicitly and explicitly—in upstream
engagement, and the lack of ability of establishing a
clear understanding of the role and function of this
engagement.
Further I argue that this understanding of trust can
be traced in existing literature on the concept of trust
it self. If 'trust' is supposed to remain an analytical
tool in establishing a social robust development of
nanotechnology, I therefore suggest an approach
where 'trust' must initially be seen in the context of
establishing an understanding of where the 'shared
questions' or conflict points are to be found. Only in
this way it is possible to see emerging technologies as
a part of emerging relationship of trust or distrust.
But this problem is not only traced in social
research applying trust in their analyses. Also in
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understanding of what relationality means for under-
standing mechanism of trust in emerging technologies.
Problems with Conventional Approaches
towards Trust: The Question of Relationality
The main reason is that the studies do not reflect
relational aspects underlying potential trust involved.
Most theories on trust agree that trust is a relational
concept [14]. Russel Hardin (Hardin [18], 10)
assumes that trust is a kind of evaluation following
the scheme of a three-part relation: A trusts B to do X.
This would be quite clear if we were dealing with a
situation where A trusts that B will give back the
money he borrowed. Or that I trust the hospital to
give me the best treatment possible. Although the
relationships involved are very different—on one
hand a person, on the other an institution—what the
trust evaluations have in common, is that the relation-
ships involved are assumed as the basis for the
evaluation. Actions and choices are likely to take
place following our evaluation of trust and distrust,
and if they do not, this could still be enlightening for
our understanding of the relationship: A wife can say
that she trusts her husband, while at the same time
acting as if she didn’t. And although I am afraid that
my plane will crash, I do eventually board the plane,
every time. How would we understand my ambiguity
towards flying compared to someone who actually
refuses to enter any plane? It seems clear that our
understanding of the quality of the trust involved very
much relies upon understanding the full context of the
relationship, as situations where actions are or are not
being made.
Now, the surveys mentioned above follow the
same scheme for exploring trust in nanotechnology.
My claim is that they fail to do so. This is not mainly
because nanotechnology is an emerging technology
and therefore a relationship-to-come. Many analyses
and evaluations on trust involve relationships with
unknown people or institutions as the basis for future
interaction. The difference between these evaluations
and those of nanotechnology, is that it is not clear to
which extent the public’s relationship with nanotech-
nology can be said to be a relationship at all. This is
due both to the “forced” relationship mentioned
above, that questions are being posed that might be
irrelevant for the respondents. It is clear that we
would not evaluate A’s trust in some person on the
other side of the globe unless we assumed that they
would somehow interact with each other. And we
would certainly not try to understand the mechanisms
behind the distrust in the French government by
studying the motivations for distrust of a citizen of
Sweden being remote from the conflict.
But this is of course difficult to avoid completely
as long as we are dealing with upstream engagement.
The main problem is that as long as ‘nanotechnology’
remains unproblematized as a concept, it is not clear
whether we are talking about an entity that can
become an object of trust or distrust in terms of action
or non-action. It is not enough to try to avoid the
abstraction caused by unfamiliarity by presenting
people for products 'close to everyday life' (Gaskell
et al. [10]:21). Given that we do not know the
substantiality of the concept nanotechnology or its
future in regulatory term, we cannot know whether
our measurements are actually referring to a relevant
problem. The relationship between nanotechnology
and the public remains vague and it is also difficult to
demonstrate what the term nanotechnology relates to.
Whereas the studies shown above focus on enriching
our understanding as if the entities of the relationship
were given—that of nanotechnology and the public—
by mapping attitudes and motivations for trust in this
particular relation, the problem, as I see it, lies in
understanding how it is or becomes a relation in the
first place, if at all. That is, whether it is a relation,
how this relation emerges and how the establishing of
the relation influences upon trust.
Surprisingly, this approach—to problematize the
relationality of trust relationships—does not find
support in any of those writings on trust that have
shifting relationships due to technological change as
their central topic.
This is mainly due to two factors. Firstly, that
studies on trust base their research upon experience
and therefore well-established relations or conflicts.
Then there is no reason to problematize the scheme
according to which the analysis is conducted, because
the relationship is there and we can try to predict trust
or distrust in similar situations by learning from the
experience of the previous ones. Secondly, there are
restrictions in the very theories of trust, because many
of them tend to conceptualize trust around interper-
sonal relations. Trust is seen as evaluations of inter-
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another agent or group of agents will perform a
particular action’ [9]. Thus trust is, as Luhmann sees
it, an answer to the problem of coping with the
freedom of others [29].
This implies that ‘trust’ is only seen in relation to
purely human interactions, and interaction between
humans and other entities like institutions or technol-
ogies are problematic or even conceptually rejected as
possible trust relationships (Luhmann [28]:102, Hardin
[18]). But then it is not so much about the phenomenon
it self as of how theory is framing it.
Similarly, trust in ‘nanotechnology’ would also be
problematic according to some definitions of trust.
Since trust is sometimes assumed to be a kind of
reflexive evaluation that excludes attitudes, prejudi-
ces, emotions or vague assumptions, it could easily be
considered flawed already from the beginning to
study ‘trust’ in the light of public attitudes at all.
But most importantly, nanotechnology is not a human
being, nor an institution, and it would therefore be
difficult to talk about trust in relation with nano-
technologies in the first place, if some theories were
to be followed. Then of course one could say that by
‘nanotechnology’ one actually means the experts. In
Giddens approach to trust, the central claim is that
modernity implies a shift from stable and well-
established, to floating situations and relations, that
are impossible to handle in terms of our own
knowledge. Therefore, trust is following our lack of
knowledge. Giddens calls this a “leap of faith”,
actively invested in expert systems of autonomous,
reflexive individuals [12].
But even if we accept Giddens’ leap, the concept
trust remains inter-personal. Like Andreas Kaminski
points out in his doctoral thesis, one can question
whether Giddens’ distinction of trust in persons and
trust in abstract systems really makes a difference,
because all in all, trust in abstract systems is trust
in experts, and then we are back to trust in persons
[23].
A second problem is that Giddens and others
associate 'trust' to 'knowledge' in a way that excludes
aspects of irrationality or other motivation grounds for
trust (Grimen [14]:23, Hardin [18]). When trust is
uniquely understood in relation with rational evalua-
tion it will—ironically—lead back to the deficit
model when applied on public understanding of
technology. Then the grounds for involving trust in
the first place—following the line of Brian Wynne—
be undermined by trust it self.
If one accepted a claim that trusting nanotechnol-
ogy means in fact trusting the experts of nanotech-
nology, or even more general, the expert community
and the authorities, there would be no reason for
challenging the scheme A trusts B with regards to X.
But if trust is supposed to help us predicting possible
controversies with nanotechnology, is it enough to
stick to such a scheme, as if nanotechnology is
something we will necessary going to interact with?
The example of Magic Nano indicates that this is
not necessarily the case.
Despite which of the assumptions regarding the
future of the concept 'nanotechnology' that will
prevail, it leads us to pose certain necessary questions
about the object of our trust analysis: Can you trust
experts regarding something you are made unaware
of, something that you don’t know about or that
doesn’t even exist?
Regardless of the substantiality of the concept of
nanotechnology, it is possible to imagine that nano-
technology will not lead to controversies, despite that
there are negative attitudes towards it, and regardless
of the possible harm caused by nanotechnological
products. This is not the same as acceptance.
This raises conceptual challenges regarding the
concept of trust and the scheme according to which
surveys on trust are conducted. Examples such as
MagicNano threatens to undermine the very founda-
tion of what people express trust or distrust in. Thus
the value of early engagement in nanotechnology can
be severely reduced, firstly because the control one
has over public attitudes in reality is lacking due to
the way the technology is implemented in society. But
more importantly, it fails to provide ‘social robust’
knowledge, because it is only measuring the degree of
acceptance. Distrust will not lead to lay influence on
the technology if the easiest way out of a controverse
is to change its name.
Although all of these factors are—or at least might
be—relevant, they are not sufficient to understand the
basic mechanisms that make distrust and trust appear
in real situations. What we do not know yet is where
distrust could arise in relation to nanotechnology.
My claim is therefore that surveys on trust in
emerging technologies like nanotechnology call for a
supplementary study on the character of the technol-
ogy in question as an object of trust. How can the
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relations involved in future actions or non-actions
taken towards novel technologies?
In most existing literature on lay people’s attitudes
towards new technologies, the main focus is usually on
people’s motives for trust or distrust, or trust is being
captured although it remains unclear whether the
expression of trust is a result of a certain framing of
the survey, or whether it will eventually lead to
precautions or actions of distrust being taken, such as
public protests, political resistance or simply commer-
cial boycott. But whereas this has an obvious relevance
in already established conflicts (actions are being taken,
a relation is established, and the motives determine the
action), it is not obvious that the same is the case for
emerging fields where even the object in question is
undetermined or at least unclear. Rather, it is reasonable
to believe that a continued focus of this kind creates
blind zones in the social research approach.
The concepts are not developed through an under-
standing of empirically based relations that show how the
motivations or attitudes actually lead to trust or distrust
through action. Therefore, in order to maintain an
analytical role in social research on emerging technolo-
gies, trust should be seen the light of two concepts:
prediction and precaution. Prediction because the
overall ambition of analyses on trust in emerging
technologies should be to some extent to predict
controverses that might arise. Precaution, because when
clear relations or potential controversies are missing or
not yet identified, a search for potential conflict points
would help to identify and to clarify such relations.
Prediction of Trust in Social Systems
A problem with many theories on trust is the
confusion regarding what we can actually have trust
in. If empirical observations of trust leads to an
essentialist understanding of the phenomenon, ‘trust’
becomes determinate for our understanding of rela-
tions rather than enlightening. In the case of nano-
technology, ‘trust’ would fail to fullfill its potential if
by ‘nanotechnology’ we simply understood an inde-
termined set of ‘experts’. Similarly, studies have
shown how social research adopts the structures of
previous experiences in evaluating new problems. If
you assume for example that nanotechnology is like
GM, as Sandler and Kay claim has been the case with
early public engagement with nanotechnology [39], it
forms the discourse in a way that might not provide
discussions that are relevant to the object in question.
It would not be possible to analyse all the relevant
factors that are decisive for acts of trust and distrust in
the future if through the lenses of ‘trust’ we would not
have the opportunity to taken into consideration the
co-production between the lay public and the tech-
nology developers. With the concept of co-
production, one assumes that scientific achievements
in society consist both of social as well as natural
orders. Thus, in order to understand how technolog-
ical entities function in the world,
‘one has to ask how diverse actors use and
understand the concept, how it is articulated
through formal and informal practices, where
a n db yw h o mi ti sc o n t e s t e d ,a n dh o wi t
reasserts itself in the face of challenges to its
integrity or meaning’ (Jasanoff [19]:19).
These variations in the understanding and use of a
concept however are not taken into account by survey
research, and yet they are quite decisive for our
understanding of how technology is actually shaped
and conceived in society. Also in the context of ‘trust’
this is an approach that would often fail to win
recognition. Again this is due to the common attitude
that ‘trust’ appears between human beings. You can rely
on a technology, but only trust the experts.
4 Therefore
studies on trust are easily forced to accept any relation
given to them, because it has not been seen as a
relevant question to challenge them. If we trust a
technology and accept the technology as an object of
trust, it is only because we trust the people who are
responsible for it. Therefore we too easily accept
‘nanotechnology’ as a given representative for its
developers, although this distinction fails to see that
there are many factors that overlap and interact
indistinctively with each other in creating what we
see as the social meaning of ‘nanotechnology’ that is
presented to us.
Therefore, nanotechnology should be seen in the
context of being a social system,
5 as an indistinct set
4 For further reading about the difference between familiarity,
confidence, reliability and trust, see [14], [18], [28] and [12].
5 I use the term “social system” [soziale Systeme] from
Luhmann’s book ‘Soziale Systeme’ [27]. Although this concept
can easily be understood in relation with trust, he does not
make this connection himself.
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public communication, governmental policies, arte-
facts and a whole range of possible relevant aspects
for the framing of nanotechnologies and the public
reception of them. There are several reasons for
considering it in this way: Firstly, nanotechnology is
not dismissed as an object of trust according to certain
definitions on trust. Secondly, studies on trust can not
assume relations between technology and the public
as relations between indistinct “experts” and the
public. And thirdly, this would change the focus of
trust studies, and provide a new analytical function to
the concept: Given that many social systems are
vague and difficult to grasp when it comes to isolate
their components, a study would initially have to
focus on analyzing the system in question in terms of
being an object of trust; to which extent it is likely to
be trusted, in which way distrust might arise, and why
this might happen. Then it is also easier to incorporate
other dimensions and aspects of trust, such as
motivations, in a relevant way. Thus, ‘trust’ can be
used as an analytical tool for understanding how
social entities are established in public as meaningful
object we can relate to.
I will give an example of what this means: If I were in
a store, faced with the choice between a GM-tomato
and a non-GM-tomato, it would be a simplification
just to analyze my final choice as an expression of
trust in GM or not and what my motivation for this
choice would be. Of course this is interesting when
GM is already present in the store and the GM-
producers observe that I and several others choose to
avoid their products. But then we already have a
situation where my actions can be understood through
my motivations and alternative actions for technology
developers can be made possible through a further
understanding of these motivations. But as many
studies on trust and distrust start here, namely, where
such conflicts are already established, the situation is
different with emerging technologies where even the
concept itself is diffuse regarding its content and
future significance. In such situations, understanding
trust will have to signify an understanding of how an
object of trust becomes an object of trust. Or, in
certain situations, whether something can even claim
the right to be called an object of trust at all. Then we
realize that something as simple as choosing a tomato
in a store is the result of several aspects regarding
trust that are not included in a study on my
motivations for action.
My action, or my precaution against choosing a
GM-tomato, is the result first and foremost of having
the choice to choose otherwise. The less available
non-GM-tomatoes are, the stronger my attitude
against GM must be for me to try to get alternatives.
The attitude itself is shaped by an indistinct mixture
of information, prejudices, trust in experts, NGO’s
and authorities, my own political standings, religious
beliefs, etc. It would probably not be possible to
understand each of these factors to a full extent. Nor
is it possible to understand them isolated from each
other. GM is not a thing, nor an object, but a
combination of techniques, content, people, visions,
political regulations and communication. Thus it
would not be adequate to reduce our understanding
of GM to only one or some of these factors. GM is
also the totality of its factors, and in relational terms
mechanism of trust and distrust should be understood
in relation with this totality.
My claim is that ‘trust’ might provide better
grounds for understanding how such entities emerge
into relations, because by understanding a social
entity, whether it is just a hype or something we
actually relate to, involve qualitiative differences that
have relevance for how they appear in the ‘real’
world. That is why understanding such entities as
‘social systems’ is a viable approach.
For example, analyzing visions of nanotechnology,
by means of epistemology, views on nature, etc., is
relevant for the discourse on trust, because one can
find compatibility or non-compatibility concerning
the views on nature and science as compared to those
of the consumer. [8, 43] But this relationship—
between the vision and the individual person—cannot
alone form the basis of a relationship that provides a
meaningful knowledge of possible precautions.
That is, although earlier experience shows how just
the term ‘GM’ is decisive for people’s general
attitudes towards all the various applications related
to GM, and therefore also relevant for understanding
the motivations of taking precautions or not, this
image itself only becomes an issue when the label
relates to something where precautions are possible in
the first place. If the term nanotechnology is shown to
be nothing but a buzzword, and the individual is
ignorant of what nanotechnology means, we would
not be able to distinguish this situation from one in
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is ‘the new GM’, if the attitudes or motivations
between them were principally the same. But what
does this mean for the concept of trust itself? Would
‘trust’ be an empty concept if it could not lead to
action? And how do we distinguish qualitatively
between various beliefs, motivations or emotions of
trust?
The concept of ‘precaution’ is particularly impor-
tant in evaluating emerging social systems. The
reason is that analyzing where and how precautions
can be taken, draws a first sketch of an emerging
relation involving trust, and problematizes this rela-
tion at the same time:
In his account on trust, Jon Elster writes about so
called ‘quasi-emotions’ (Elster [7]:71). People can
express certain feelings that do not lead to a
subsequent action. For example, one can be upset
about poverty in the Third World, without there being
even the slightest movement in one’s wallet. Elster
calls this sentimentality. In principle, a sentimental
person would have exactly the same feelings as a
person who would donate some money or as a person
who would devote his entire life to fighting poverty.
But there are obvious differences between the three
people in this matter that are so important that they
would make any analysis which did not incorporate
them irrelevant. In order to understand emotions, it is
not enough to try to catch and determine the
experience of them; they must be seen in context
with their outcome in possible actions, and in which
respect emotions become determinate for relations.
Distrust comes, as Pidgeon and Poortinga state in
many shapes, some of which are good [37]. The
utmost challenge to technology developers is when
distrust manifests itself through active rejection. For
social research, it can neither be a premise of the
research that distrust is bad, nor should social research
focus solely on mapping emotions or attitudes that are
seen in relation to an unquestioned, given object. On
what grounds do we determine what trust is? Elster
quotes La Rochefoucauld, who once wrote that ‘some
people would have never fallen in love if they had
never heard of love’ (op.cit., 161). Using ‘trust’
uncritically in surveys provides the challenges that
we give name to an expected feeling or attitude in
people that probably would not have existed without
our interference, or at least, would have had fewer
behavioural manifestations. In a broader sense,
regarding our own work, we would not pay sufficient
attention to the role or significance of the concept in the
first place. This does not mean that Elster’st h e o r yi s
encompassing all relevant aspects of trust. But his
approach is of particularly interest in the field of public
understanding of nanotechnology, because the focus on
possible precautions makes it possible to make initial
determinations of the relationship in question. Elster’s
focus on actions and precautions is of particular
relevance in relation to such a complex and difficult
notion as nanotechnology, because it forces relation-
ships, or the lack of such relationships, to manifest
themselves and thus makes further analysis in a
somewhat vague and undefined landscape possible.
The inner qualities oftrust are alreadydifficulttosort
out. Annette C. Baier, whose writings stand among the
pioneer works in the literature on trust, has pointed to
several characteristics that make trust so difficult to
define, even in relationships that are familiar to us, such
as those between individuals. As she puts it:
‘Trust is one of those mental phenomena
attention to which shows us the inadequacy of
attempting to classify mental phenomena into
the “cognitive”, the “affective” and the “cona-
tive”. Trust, if it is any of these, is all three. It
has its special “feel”, most easily acknowledged
when it is missed, say, when one moves from a
friendly “safe” neighborhood to a tense insecure
one. It has its (usually implicit) belief compo-
nent, belief in the trusted’s goodwill and
competence, which then grounds the willingness
to be or remain within the trusted’s power in a
way the distrustful are not, and to give the
trusted distrustful are not, and to give the trusted
discretionary powers in matters of concern to us.
When we trust, we accept vulnerability to
others’ ([1]:132).
She characterizes trust and distrust as feelings that are
‘like what Hume called ‘impressions of reflexion’,
feeling responses to how we take our situation to be.’
(op.cit., 131) But what exactly is our situation when
confronted with nanotechnology? The complexity of
the notion of trust alone shows us that we have
insufficient knowledge to provide rich and satisfying
answers. We do not know whether the trusted object
is good or bad. Subsequently, we do not know
whether trust is good or bad. We know little about
the strength and character of the opinions expressed,
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opinions can manifest themselves into action. This is
perhaps not surprising, as we are—despite there being
products already on the market—still talking about an
emerging technology. But still, there are some aspects
we should look for, aspects that are in accordance
with what we already know about trust and distrust in
technologies.
For example we know that although a shift has
occurred in social research regarding a lack of trust
versus a lack of information, it is not true that a lack
of trust can always be explained by the values and
attitudes of the public involved. Nor can trust and
distrust be explained solely by the communication of
information or the hyping through utopias and
dystopias, creating optimistic or pessimistic ‘imagi-
naries’ in the lay public’s minds. Although all of these
factors are—or at least might be—relevant, they are
not sufficient to understand the basic mechanisms that
make distrust and trust appear in real situations. What
we do not know yet is where distrust could arise in
relation to nanotechnology. Both are important pre-
conditions for understanding situations as locations
for gaining socially robust knowledge, as well as for
the general understanding of mechanisms of trust.
Using ‘precautions’ as the initial approach to
understand social systems helps us identifying how
relations appear, and to which extend and in which
sense they involve trust. Thus it is possible to use
‘trust’ as an analytical tool for understanding social
entities and how they interact upon each other,
distinguishing between those who will not interact
(images for example) and those who will.
This is important also for maintaining the impor-
tant role of trust in social research, because it binds
trust to empirical findings instead of normativity
loosened from empirical grounds:
In a much quoted article on the concept of trust in
risk regulation, Poortinga and Pidgeon [37] point to
the important observation that although trust is
conceived as an important aspect of the relationship
between the public and technology, it often remains
unproblematized whether trust, as such, is something
necessary and good. Through additional survey work,
they outline the alternative notion of critical trust,
which is meant to show that trust and distrust are
complementary phenomena that often operate togeth-
er in various combinations, and often for the good—
for technology as well as for the public. When
people’s motives for trust are the main focus, the
answer is often that one has to strive for better
conditions for trust. But then again it remains
unproblematized what all this trust is good for in the
first place. Poortinga and Pidgeon’s point is enlight-
ening in this respect, but it still remains an open
question how trust and distrust operate, what forms
them, and what kind of interests are the motivating
factors behind their re-conceptualization.
The initial focus should therefore be likeliness to
be trusted, so that trust and trustworthiness are not
understood as a normative, that is, whether nanotech-
nology should be trusted or not, but as to whether it is
implemented in a way that is likely or not likely to
cause controversies. Only then the role and function
of trust is properly reflected into the relation, and only
then one could add other dimensions to the analysis,
as to whether controversies, or the lack of them,
should or should not have taken place. If you take a
social system as given and analyse trust in relation
with it, you might get the wrong answer because your
understanding of the relation in question is wrong.
Concluding Remarks
Richard Jones has showed how difficult it is to make
people have any relationship with a concept encom-
passing so many areas and applications, and thus,
contrary to concrete applications or a nuclear factory,
it is difficult to determine what this trust or distrust
would actually be an expression of. Different levels or
dimensions of trust, as the ones exemplified by
Poortinga or by Wynne, can only be fully explored
when the entire spectre of a relationship is clearly
expressed. This has hardly been done, despite that
already in 2003 there was a general attitude that
nanotechnology was better thought of as a ‘multifac-
eted and malleable group of technologies’, difficult to
associate to specific areas of application [44]. Despite
this assumed
6 early engagement in a field of
technology which still remains largely unknown to
the public, it is surprising to see how looking at the
very conditions for involving lay people in a way that
actually produces interaction is still missing. If this
6 It is contested whether the social engagement work on
nanotechnology has come in very early or too late. See for
example: Mnyusiwalla et al. [32].
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the term ‘nanotechnology’, to see whether it was to
relate it with trust or distrust. A series of examples
show how difficult this is.
I have tried to show how trust and trustworthiness
can serve as analytical tools in social research on
nanotechnology. In a situation where the object in
question is still somewhat blurred even to the initiates
and where we seemingly enter a landscape that is
much more complex than what is usual in societal
contexts where trust is at stake, a possible first
approach would be to analyze the concept ‘nanotech-
nology’ in terms of its possible conflict points, in
other words, where public precautions in terms of
trust or distrust might appear. This is important simply
to understand what we are talking about and in what
respect it is useful to use the nano label when
engaging the public. A further and full analysis of
the trustworthiness of nanotechnology would eventu-
ally have to analyze other aspects of its trustworthi-
ness, according to more traditional parameters, such
as stakeholder aspects, risk aspects and the quality of
regulatory work, all in close relation with the societal
aspects of the ‘imaginaries’ of nanotechnology that
will or will not eventually be established in the public
when conclusively coined and shaped. Although
many of these aspects are already established
approaches within social research for enhancing
public assent through cooperation, it nevertheless still
remains an open question as to what extent they are
sufficient if social research wants to enhance socially
robust technology. The reason is that the concept
‘nanotechnology’ transgresses what we usually
think of within institutionalf r a m e ss u c ha se x p e r t s ,
authorities, risk analysis, etc. Public distrust in
science can appear in all of these contexts, but it
can also appear on grounds that are not captured by
enhancing trustworthiness on these grounds. The
large number of various stakeholders simply makes
it impossible, and unforeseen factors can lead to
actions of distrust. The concept ‘nanotechnology’
itself is one of them.
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